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Abstract 
 
What insights can be gained from bringing the theory of the firm to the global economy? I discuss 
several new features of the world economy that can be explained by incorporating the theory of the 
firm into the theory of international trade. Among the new features I discuss are the move to flatter 
corporate hierarchies and the decentralization of authority in firms, the “war for talent”, the rise of 
CEO pay in rich countries, organizational convergence across countries, and firm heterogeneity. 
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In his paper Pol gives an excellent review and new ideas of how Grossman and Hart (1986)  (GH) 
have influenced recent developments in international trade. The “new new trade theory” opens the 
black box of the firm and brings firms with organizations into international trade and foreign direct 
investment (for an overview, see Helpman, Marin, Verdier 2008).  Similar to the development of the 
theory of the firm (see Bolton and Scharfstein 1998), the theory of international trade and 
organizations (ITO) has been developing in two directions. One approach focusses on the boundaries 
of the multinational corporation (see Grossman and Helpman 2002, Antras 2003, Antras and 
Helpman 2004, 2008, Nunn and Trefler 2008); the second approach focusses on the internal 
organization of national and multinational firms (Marin and Verdier 2003, 2008a,b,c, 2009, 2011,  
Puga and Trefler 2010,  Antras, Garicano, Rossi-Hansberg 2006, 2008, Bloom, Sadun, van Reenen 
2010, Guadalupe and Wulf 2010, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg 2011, Marin and Rousova 2011, 
Marin, Rousova, Verdier 2012).  In his paper, Pol mainly describes the literature on the boundaries of 
the multinational corporation of which he and Elhanan Helpman, are the leading exponents. This is 
natural, because the theory of the international organization of production is a direct offspring of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) taken to the global economy. However, GH had an indirect influence on 
the theories of internal organizations such as Aghion and Tirole (1997) which have been incorporated 
into trade models.  Therefore, I will use my discussion to talk about the second approach.  
Why should we take the theory of the firm global? In the last two decades the nature of international 
trade has been changing. Modern economic commerce involves movements across international 
boundaries – but often within the boundaries of the firm. It is often characterized by a “war for talent” 
rather than a “war for market shares”. Firms engaged in international trade have met these challenges 
of the new features of world trade by organizing production in an international value chain, by 
decentralizing their system of command in flatter corporate hierarchies, by making human capital to 
the new stakeholder of the firm, and by compensating their CEOs with skyrocket earnings. Thus, we 
ask: have international trade and competition been the driving forces behind these observed changes 
in the corporation? i 
 
In Marin and Verdier (2008a, 2008b, 2011) we introduce internal hierarchies into models of 
international trade with imperfect competition to answer how international trade may lead to flatter 
corporate hierarchies, to decentralization of decision making in the firm, to a “war for talent”, to a rise 
in CEO pay in rich countries, to organizational convergence across countries, and to heterogeneity 
across firms in the same industry.  I will briefly discuss how international trade can give rise to each 
of these phenomena in turn. ii 
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International Trade and Flatter Corporate Hierarchies 
Theory    
In Marin and Verdier (2008a, 2008b) we introduce a variant of the Aghion and Tirole (1997) (AT) 
theory of the firm into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition and into a Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) model of international trade in order to examine how international trade may 
affect corporate organization in similar countries (North-North Trade).  
 
In the AT theory of the firm the owner (the principal) hires a manager (the agent) to bring new 
projects to the firm. Once the contract is signed both, the principal and the agent, may exert effort to 
find profitable projects for the firm. To make things interesting, we assume that there is a conflict of 
interest between the owner and the manager: the manager will suggest a high cost project – a project 
that maximizes his private benefits (perks, career concerns) rather than a project which maximizes the 
profits of the firm. Moreover, it is assumed that the manager’s effort to find profitable projects is not 
contractible. The parties cannot write a contract over the manager’s effort (here is where GH comes 
in) and thus once the manager is employed, the amount of effort he provides - which is costly to the 
manager - will depend on how likely it is that the owner will overrule the manager’s project 
suggestion. This, in turn, will depend on two things: first, how much effort in finding projects the 
owner herself undertakes and second, whether the owner allocates formal authority to herself or 
delegates it to the manager. If the owner holds formal authority and undertakes some information 
collection herself, it is more likely that she will overrule the manager’s project suggestion and in this 
case the manager will be discouraged to look for projects for the firm. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between control and initiative in the firm. Having a boss – hierarchies – is bad, because it destroys the 
initiative of workers.  However, if the owner decides not to look for projects, say due to overload, and 
the manager searches and proposes a project, it is profitable for the owner/principal to follow his 
suggestion. In this case, the manager has “real” rather than “formal” authority.  Alternatively, the 
owner may decide to keep the manager’s initiative alive and to decentralize the decision to the 
manager. In this case the manager has “formal” authority.    
 
In Marin and Verdier (2008b) we bring the AT-firm into a one sector economy with monopolistic 
competition with differentiated goods a la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) (MO). In each firm a principal 
hires a manager to monitor projects and workers to produce. As in AT the allocation of authority in 
these firms is governed by the trade-off between control and initiative. Consumers have linear demand 
across a continuum of varieties and price mark-ups become endogenous and a function of the 
toughness of competition in the market. 
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How is trade openness affecting the trade-off between control and initiative in the firm?  With more 
trade, the market becomes larger and profits increase. When profits increase, the owner/principal 
monitors more, since there is more at stake. When the trade shock is sufficiently large, the stakes rise 
and owners in firms are monitoring so much that they destroy the initiative of their managers in the 
firm. To prevent this from happening, principals decide to delegate formal authority to their managers. 
At the same time, however, more trade means more foreign competition. Tougher competition, in 
turn, makes incentives between the owner and the manager less aligned. The conflict of interest 
between owner and manager rises and, hence, the owner monitors more. At some level of 
competition, the owner decides to delegate authority to the manager to encourage his initiative. Thus, 
with more trade, decentralization to the manager occurs, because under her formal authority the owner 
cannot otherwise keep the manager’s initiative alive.     
 
Incorporating AT into international trade brings two important insights. First, the trade-off between 
control and initiative of the AT model disappears in very weak and very tough trade environments. As 
a result, the relationship between international trade and the level of decentralization is non-
monotonic. Firms in a small market protected from foreign competition have small profits in which 
owners/principals monitor little and do not destroy the initiative of managers. In protected markets 
there are no costs of control in the firm, because firms can keep the initiative of their managers alive 
even when principals have formal authority. Hence, the firm organization is centralized in trade 
protected markets. Firms in large open markets face tough competition, but profits are unambiguously 
larger (the market size effect dominates the competition effect when trade is liberalized). As the 
stakes are very large, principals in firms monitor and search so intensively that they destroy the 
initiative of their managers even when they decentralize and delegate formal authority to them. 
Hence, there are again no costs of control, since the principal cannot keep the enthusiasm of the 
manager alive even when she empowers him. The organization will again be centralized in markets 
very open to trade. Only at intermediate levels of trade openness is there a trade-off between control 
and initiative as described in the theory of the firm of AT. Principals decentralize power to their 
managers to keeps their initiative alive.  
 
Second, the conflict of interest between owners/principals and managers/agents (congruence in the 
parlance of AT) becomes endogenous and a function of the trade environment that firms face. In 
markets more open to trade the conflict of interest between the owner and the manager increases. It 
matters more who runs the firm in a more competitive environment. When the manager has formal 
authority, he chooses the larger cost project (which maximizes his private benefit) which translates in 
more profit losses to the firm in a tougher trade environment.  Profits decline more in firms run by the 
6

manager, because high cost firms loose more sales and fight this loss by lowering their price mark- 
ups compared to low cost firms run by principals.   
 
 
 
 
Empirics 
 
In Marin and Verdier (2008b) we derive predictions from the theory and expose them to the data. We 
predict that in a cross-section of firms, firms will have more decentralized corporate 
hierarchies when they face tougher competition and they are more exposed to international trade. We 
predict further that organizational change towards less hierarchical firms is more likely to happen in 
firms more exposed to international trade. We test these predictions for a cross-section of 2200 firms 
with novel data which we have designed and collected among German and Austrian corporations.  
The data are a full population survey of firms in Austria and Germany investing in Eastern Europe 
including Russia and Ukraine. Our dataset provides detailed information on the internal organization 
of firms in the two countries. We measure delegation of authority by asking the CEO at the 
headquarters of the corporation: “Who decides in your company over the following decisions listed in 
Figure 1, please rank between 1 taken at headquarters and 5 taken at the divisional level?” The figure 
reveals that firms in the smaller economy, Austria, are more centralized compared to firms in the 
larger economy, Germany. This finding is in accordance with the theory, since the theory predicts that 
in larger more competitive markets firms are more likely to decentralize authority.  The figure also 
reveals that there is a stark variation in the allocation of authority across different types of corporate 
decisions. The decision over acquisitions, finance, and over a new strategy tend to be centrally 
organized in firms, the decision over hiring and firing of personnel appears to be decentralized to the 
divisional level, while R&D and the decision to introduce a new product, or to change a supplier are 
typically joint decisions between headquarters and the divisional level in firms. The pattern of power 
allocation in firms is strikingly similar in both countries.     
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Figure 1: Corporate Decisions ranked by the level of Decentralization 
 
We then rank each firm by its level of decentralization by averaging over the hierarchical score of the 
16 corporate decisions listed in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the correlation between the number of 
foreign competitors as perceived by firms and the level of decentralization in firms in Austria and 
Germany. In both countries firms with a larger number of foreign competitors tend to be more 
decentralized.  Note also, that - as predicted by the theory - in the larger more competitive economy, 
Germany, firms recentralize authority when competition becomes very tough. To show that 
decentralization of decision making power is driven in particular to encourage managers to bring new 
ideas to the firm, we examined the allocation of authority for two corporate decisions - the decision 
over R&D and the decision to introduce a new product - separately for which empowerment may 
matter most. We indeed find in the empirical analysis that firms respond much quicker to an increase 
in international trade by changing the allocation of power over the R&D decisions compared to the 
other corporate decisions.          
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Figure 2:  Level of Decentralization and Foreign Competition 
 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2010) use a similar measure of decentralization between 
headquarters and middle managers which they collected for several countries such as the US, UK, 
Europe and Asia. Interestingly, they find that the US, UK and Northern European countries are the 
most decentralized and the Asian countries the most centralized. They also find a positive correlation 
between the level of decentralization and product market competition. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) 
(GW) use the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989 as a natural experiment to address 
issues of causality. They see the FTA as an exogenous increase in competition for US firms in 
industries where tariffs were removed. GW analyze panel data for the US and their measure of 
organization is the breadth and depth of hierarchy defined as the number of positions reporting to the 
CEO and the number of positions between the CEO and the division managers. They find that 
German Corporations
2.88
2.9
2.92
2.94
2.96
2.98
3
3.02
3.04
3.06
No Few Many Intense
Number of foreign competitors
Le
v
el
 
of
 
De
ci
si
on
s
decentralized 
centralized 
Austrian Corporations
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Few Many Intense
Number of foreign competitors
Le
ve
l o
f D
ec
is
io
n
s
decentralized 
centralized 
9

increased foreign competition leads to downsizing and the removal of hierarchical layers in the 
corporation. 
  
International Trade and the “war for talent” 
 
In the previous section we examined the effect of North-North trade on the way firms organize. I turn 
now to how North-South trade may influence corporate organization in different countries. In Marin 
and Verdier (2003, 2011) we introduce a variant of the Aghion and Tirole (1997) theory of the firm 
into a Helpman and Krugman (1985) (HK) model of international trade in which countries differ in 
factor endowments.  We consider a world economy consisting of two countries, the human capital 
rich North, and the labour rich South. In each country there are two sectors: the X-sector produces 
differentiated goods under monopolistic competition and the Y-sector produces homogenous goods 
under perfect competition. In each firm in the X-sector a principal hires a skilled manager to run the 
firm. We assume that the X-sector is more skill intensive than the Y-sector. Consumers’ preferences 
over the two goods Y and X are given by CES utility.  
 
We gain several insights from putting the partial equilibrium theory of the firm of AT in general 
equilibrium of trade of HK. First, the mode of organization that firms choose becomes a function of 
relative factor prices, and therefore, in equilibrium, of relative factor endowments of countries. In 
countries where skilled labor is relatively scarce, the wages of unskilled workers will tend to be low, 
while the startup costs of a firm (which consist of the wages of skilled managers) will tend to be high, 
thus making entry more costly. These forces tend to make the ratio of profits to unskilled wages high 
in skill-scarce countries and low in skill abundant countries. It follows that countries with very high or 
very low ratios of skilled managers to unskilled workers will tend to have firms in which principals 
keep formal authority, while in countries with intermediate ratios of skills the mode of organization in 
which authority is delegated to skilled managers might prevail.  
 
Second, we find that in the general equilibrium of the closed economy, there exists a range of relative 
factor endowments for which there are multiple equilibria, with all principals in the monopolistically 
competitive X-sector either decentralizing or not decentralizing authority.  
 
Third, we show in the Rybczynski theorem of firm organization that there also exists a range of factor 
endowments for which we get a unique mixed equilibrium, with some principals decentralizing 
formal authority and some principals keeping it to themselves. In this range, factor prices are 
independent of factor endowments: factor market clearing comes about through a relocation of 
resources from one organizational mode to the other (in equilibrium, different organizational modes 
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differ in their factor intensity). In this range of factor endowments the mode of organization becomes 
a new source of comparative advantage. 
 
How does international trade affect corporate organization in the skill rich North? Suppose that the 
North is sufficiently skill rich. Then in autarky the start-up costs (the cost of a manager) in the North 
will be low relative to wages of low skilled workers. As the stakes are low, principals in firms monitor 
little and do not destroy the initiative of managers. Thus, in autarky principals will keep formal 
authority and choose a centralized organization. When the skill rich North opens up to trade,  it 
specializes more in the skill intensive monitoring activity resulting in a fall in the relative wage for 
low skilled workers and an increase in profits. When profits increase, firms want to enter the market. 
As firms can enter and run a firm only by hiring a skilled manager, market entry is constrained by the 
pool of available managers in the country. Firms compete for the limited amount of skilled managers 
available in the economy pushing up the relative wage for skilled managers. Thus, with more trade, 
manager talent has more opportunities outside the firm and managers becomes more mobile resulting 
in a “war for talent” triggered by trade liberalization.  With the rise in start-up costs of firms, the 
stakes rise and principals start to monitor more destroying the initiative of managers. When the trade 
shock is sufficiently large, principals decentralize formal authority to the skilled manager and the 
talent firm emerges in equilibrium.  
 
International Trade and the Rise of Executive Pay 
The compensation of executive board members in industrialized countries has become a highly 
controversial topic as CEO pay increased six fold from 1980-2005 in the US and 3.5 fold from 1977-
2008 in Germany.  
Why is international trade a candidate to explain the rise of executive pay? Recent long-run time 
series evidence for the US in the period 1936-2005 (Frydman and Saks 2010) and for Germany 
(Fabbri and Marin 2011) suggest that the available explanations for the surge in executive 
compensation receive only modest support from the data if at all. A proper understanding of the rise 
in executive pay requires integrating the theory of the firm into international trade theory. Most of the 
explanations on executive pay (except Gabaix and Landier (2008)) have in common that they focus on 
failures in the internal control mechanism of firms, but they neglect the market environment in which 
firms operate, in particular the market for executives. In Marin and Verdier (2011) we examine both 
the incentives inside firms as well as how these incentives interact with the trade environment firms’ 
face allowing us to analyse how international trade affects executive pay.  
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One major prediction of our theory is that globalization is leading to a rise in executive pay above and 
beyond the typical trade induced increases in the skill premium in skill rich countries. The mechanism 
by which international trade may lead to a rise in CEO pay in the skill rich North is that international 
trade puts pressure on the demand for managers for two novel reasons: the “war for talent”, and an 
economy wide shift to a more skill intensive organization. As described before, in the “war for talent” 
new firms enter the market and compete with incumbent firms for the available manager talent in the 
North in order to start a firm which pushes up the relative wage of skilled managers. The skill bias 
organizational change involves an economy wide move from a low-skill intensive organization, in 
which the owner runs the firm, to a skill intensive organization in which the skilled manager runs the 
firm.   
 
Empirical papers so far have focussed on two mechanisms by which international trade may lead to a 
rise in CEO pay. Cunat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) show that firms in the UK and the US shift to 
more incentive based pay when confronted with more import competition.  In Marin (2009) I find that 
firms pay their managers more when they are engaged in the search for talent. I use firms’ 
participation in talent fairs as a measure for the “war for talent”.  Fabbri and Marin (2011) find that an 
increase in average CEO pay in Germany - as a proxy for a local competition for managers - has been 
the driving force behind the rise in CEO pay in Germany, while US average CEO pay - as a proxy for 
a global competition for talent - has a significant but economically unimportant influence.  
 
Figure 3 documents the positive correlation between the firms’ intensity of talent search and CEO pay 
in Austria and Germany. The intensity of talent search is measured by the fraction of talent fairs firms 
participated in relative to the total number of talent fairs taking place in Germany and Austria.  The 
larger the fraction, the more intensively the firm engages in the search for talent.  
 
Figure 3: The “war for talent” and CEO Pay 
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Organizational Convergence 
I am turning now to a further insight we gain from introducing the AT-firm into international trade. In 
Marin and Verdier (2008a, 2011) we show that international trade will lead to convergence in 
corporate cultures across countries.  In Marin and Verdier (2008a) we examine how international 
trade affects corporate organization in similar countries. We show that decentralizing authority to 
lower levels of the corporation and the move to less hierarchical organizations emerge in equilibrium 
when competition is neither too tough nor too weak. The model produces multiple equilibria which 
arise out of strategic complementarities among firms’ organizational decisions. Firms’ organizational 
choices determine market conditions, which in turn, influence an individual firm’s choice of firm 
organization. This feedback mechanism can account for why two otherwise identical countries may 
have a different corporate organization in autarky.  Firms in one country may choose a particular firm 
organization (like Italy with a relatively more centralized organization compared to the US which is 
more decentralized), because they expect other firms in that country to choose this organization. In 
this theory, international trade may result in convergence of corporate organization across countries. 
However, the organizational equilibrium to which the world economy converges remains 
undetermined. 
In Marin and Verdier (2011) we allow countries to differ in factor endowments which enable us to 
predict to which organizational equilibrium the integrated world economy will converge. In the 
integrated world economy we predict the emergence of firms with decentralized corporate hierarchies 
in which human capital becomes the new stakeholder of the firm.   
 
How is convergence coming about? In the human capital rich North international trade leads to a 
stronger specialization in the skill intensive monitoring activity resulting in an increase in profits and 
more monitoring by principals. Eventually, principals decentralize authority to human capital to keep 
the initiative alive. In the labour rich South, trade leads to a resource reallocation towards the labour 
intensive sector and to a decline in profits with some firms exiting the market lowering the start-up 
cost of firms. As there is less at stake, principals in South firms care less about control and more about 
gaining the initiative of middle managers and hence delegate authority to them. This results in a shift 
towards decentralization. Thus, in the integrated world economy all principals in both countries 
decentralize authority to human capital - the emergence of the talent firm - even when no principal in 
any of the two countries was decentralizing in autarky.  
  
We give conditions under which an organizational equilibrium with decentralized firms is more likely 
to emerge in the integrated world economy which waits to be put to an empirical test. One main 
prediction from Marin and Verdier (2011) is that the more different the countries are in terms of 
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relative factor endowments, the more they will trade with one another (controlling for country size) 
and thus the more likely is organizational convergence. Furthermore, from Marin and Verdier (2008a) 
we derive the prediction that the more a country trades with other countries which have firms with 
decentralized organizations the more likely it is that this country’s firms will also decentralize. Hence, 
it is the volume of trade as well as the type of organizations which dominates in the trading partners’ 
country which matters for convergence.  
 
Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Organization 
I turn now to the last insight we gain from incorporating AT into trade. Firm heterogeneity in size and 
productivity in the same industry has been widely documented in empirical firm level studies (see 
Bernard et al (2007)).  Melitz (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) introduce firm heterogeneity 
into models of international trade by assuming an exogenous ex-ante distribution of potential 
productivity levels. After entry, competition provides an endogenous mechanism for selection of the 
equilibrium distribution of productivity within an industry. Trade integration leads to a reallocation to 
high productivity firms within a sector resulting in an increase in aggregate productivity.    
But what determines differences in productivity and size across firms in the same industry in the first 
place? In Marin and Verdier (2008c) we focus on understanding the sources of firms’ ex-ante 
heterogeneity by asking: Do firms differ in size and productivity in the same industry because they 
adopt different types of organizations? We introduce organizational choices in a Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008) model of trade. Our model simultaneously determines firms’ organizational choices and 
heterogeneity across firms in size and productivity. To understand how firm heterogeneity in the same 
industry emerges in our model, it is important to recall the distinction between “formal” and “real” 
authority in Aghion and Tirole (1997).  In AT there are two sources of authority:  authority  allocated 
by contract - “formal authority”, and authority obtained by being better informed -“real authority”.  
Recall also that the manager/agent chooses a high cost project when he has authority in the firm rather 
than the low cost project that maximizes the firm’s profits (which gets chosen when the owner has 
authority in the firm). In an organizational equilibrium in which the principal/owner has “formal 
authority” in the firm (which will arise when trade is not too open or very open), there will be firms – 
depending on the amount of information collection by both the owner and the manager – in which the 
manager/agent has “real authority”.  In these firms, the manager implements the high cost project that 
maximizes his private benefit. Similarly, in an organizational equilibrium in which the manager/agent 
has “formal authority” (which will arise when the trade shock is at an intermediate level)  there will 
be firms in which the owner has “real authority”. In these firms, the owner implements the low cost 
project that maximizes the profits of the firm.  This way, low cost and high cost firms coexist in 
equilibrium, although the equilibrium is unique in “formal authority”.       
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We provide further interesting results. We show that the firms’ organizational choice feeds back to the 
market place. The toughness of competition becomes a function of who has authority in the firm, 
principals or agents. Furthermore, we propose two new margins of trade adjustment: the monitoring 
margin and the organizational margin. Depending on which of these margins dominates, trade 
liberalization may lead to higher or lower aggregate productivity.   

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